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Jan-Melissa Schramm – mss submitted and revised Oct 2014; in press now, 
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 Sacrifice and the Inner Organs of the Cold War Citizen 
 
Adam Piette 
 
As a historical continuum within the citizen imagination, the Cold War existed 
as a set of internalized mechanisms for the imperiling and domination of the 
subject. In the more extreme fictions staging this anxiety this appears as a fear 
for one’s internal organs, according to a sacrificial logic threatening innocent 
citizen ‘insides’: through repressed terror about radiation's genetic damage, 
paranoid scening of victimization of the unconscious, and fallout 
hypochondria dramatizing the triangular nature of Cold War geopolitics as 
inward disease. I will be exploring such anxieties in a series of texts which 
include Samuel Beckett's Trilogy and its parodies of Sartrean politics, 
inwardness and the French Cold War; Elizabeth Bowen's 1964 novel The Little 
Girls and its representation of bunker mentality; J.G. Ballard's 1969 The 
Atrocity Exhibition and its exploration of victimizing technology; Douglas 
Oliver's 1973 novel The Harmless Building and its staging of inner organ 
anxiety and warfare. Theoretically, the chapter will be underpinned by René 
Girard on scapegoating and mimetic desire, as well as Walter Benjamin's 
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‘Critique of Violence’ and his essay on Goethe's Elective Affinities with its 
exploration of sacrificial history; these will be used to revise Agamben's Homo 
Sacer theory slightly (following Anselm Haverkamp) to enable a targeted 
interpretation of Cold War sacrificial codes. 
 
Samuel Beckett's Trilogy, Sartre and the French Cold War 
 
In Beckett’s Molloy, two men cross paths outside a small town, between 
‘treacherous hills’, the sea to the east, with Molloy as hidden observer, 
observing too his own imagined interiority: ‘all that inner space one never 
sees, the brain the heart and other caverns where thought and feeling dance 
their sabbath, all that too quite differently disposed’.1 This triangle, Molly, two 
men crossing paths, is spatio-temporalized to imply a treacherous form of 
fourth-dimensional identity. The outgoing wayfarer, named B in the French 
and C in the English translation, fixes the details of the terrain in his mind as 
he moves down from a vantage point in the hills (a monument), vowing to 
himself to act differently if he were to return. Fixing landmarks in his mind 
enables the future returning self (the figure whose path he crosses, we 
presume) to be an expert on the landscape, capable of blending the possibly 
                                                 
1 Samuel Beckett, Three Novels: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable (London: 
John Calder, 1959), p. 10. 
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treacherous prospect of the view from the vantage point with the detailed 
mapping of features the walk along the road has made possible. The two 
experiences together create the conditions for the possibility of a successful 
third passage along the road, topographical expertise allied with new 
knowledge about the secret dispositions of inner space. All the while, 
paranoid fear is being generated by the wayfarer’s act of observation; body, 
reason, self  are ‘threatened’ and the ‘anxiety’ has been sexed up into a battle 
between innocence and dark actors (10) which is somehow related to carnal 
interiority: ‘that unstable fugitive thing, still living flesh’ (11). The incident is 
troubling, fusing non-event with radical suspense, as though political anxiety 
were somatic and phenomenological, a spacetime event.  
 Naming the two figures A and B alludes, parodically, to the discussion 
of relations between time and self-perception in Sartre’s 1943 L’Etre et le 
néant, particularly the chapter ‘Ontologie de la temporalité’ on the problems 
posed by temporal difference to self-identity: ‘Let us suppose a temporal 
content A existing as a being-in-itself, and a temporal content B, posterior to 
the first and existing in the same mode — that is, in the self-inclusion of 
identity.’2 But, Sartre argues, because A and B must be mutually incomplete 
                                                 
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Etre et le néant: Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique 
(1943); Being and Nothingness, translated Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 
1969), p. 132. 
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without the determination figured by the other temporal content, then it 
follows that A and B cannot be autonomously self-identical: the ‘liaison’ 
between them ‘hang[s] in midair, deprived of any substratum, without power 
to get any hold on either A or B — in a sort of non-temporal nothingness’ 
(Being, 132). 
 Sartre’s naming itself plays with Poincaré’s formula for the idea of 
temporal succession between selves: a = b, b = c, a ÷ c, which acknowledges 
the necessity of the third witness as B to adjudicate the differences between A 
and C. This explains the translation Beckett made of his French A and B as A 
and C in the English version. To act as intermediary, B must chronologically 
‘occur’ between A and C, and therefore cannot know C. Sartre suggests that 
only by distinguishing between the supposed ‘en-soi’ of A and C and the 
‘pour-soi’ nature of B can the triangle be achieved. Molloy, then, is a ‘pour-soi’ 
witness of both A and B, because his own destructively negative and negating 
selfhood is contained, existentially, within both forms as the shadow to their 
differential autonomies. He can act as both divisive C to their ontologies, as in 
the French, and as mediating B, as in the English translation. And C/B is 
appropriate since it signals Corps/Body: for the body can play the role of the 
‘pour-soi’, according to Sartre. Indeed, the unsettling fact about our own 
bodies is that they contain a mysterious set of features such as ‘a nervous 
system, a brain, glands, digestive, respiratory, and circulatory organs whose 
matter is capable of being analyzed chemically into atoms of hydrogen, 
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carbon, nitrogen, phosphorous etc.’ (Being, 303). The silent witness of our 
journeying through space and time in the mind can be identified, fraudulently, 
with our silent somatic companions, the inner organs so faithfully acting ‘pour 
soi’. Why, however, is the act of witnessing so fraught with anxiety? 
 In the French, Molloy is watching B move out of the town as though 
with the eyes of B’s former self, since he occupies the high ground perspective 
B learned from the monument. Molloy equally resembles B’s present self, 
since he can speculate, as if remembering, about B’s inner state of mind as he 
walks, knows that B is scanning the landscape to commit them to memory. 
Sartre’s anguished man wrings his hands and cries: ‘ “Qu’est-ce que je vais 
faire? Mais qu’est-ce que je vais faire?”’ (64);3 Molloy’s B is prey to a deadly 
inner voice, rising from murmur to scream, ‘cet insatiable Comment faire? 
Comment faire?” (11)4 Molloy is present, too, at the possible return of the 
wayfarer: in the future, B will be hunting for signs of his human presence in 
the scene, presence as rock, feature, look-out. The returning wayfarer is 
figured in the shape of A, confident of the landscape, but with a club in his 
hands, aware of something in the surroundings which might prove harmful to 
                                                 
3 Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Etre et le néant: Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique, ed. 
Arlette Elkaim-Sartre (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), p. 64. 
4 French Molloy (Paris: Les Editions de minuit, 1951), p. 11. ‘What shall I do? 
What shall I do?’ (10) 
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him, despite his indolence, his lazy kindness to the dog, despite even Molloy’s 
own imagined meeting with him, for he walks with ‘anxious looks’ (14). The 
ghost presence of Molloy’s own anxiety haunts the scene and the imagined 
interiority of A and B. Yet it is a ghost presence founded on an idea of 
interiority as flesh, as somatic inner space, as fugitive body, dark shadow in 
the landscape. Molloy is the idea of the treacherous diasporic body inhabiting 
the existential situation as fleshly-ghostly witness-‘autrui’. He is both feared by 
the two manifestations of his ‘en-soi’, A and B (because they are potentially 
subject to Molloy’s anxiety), and fearful of the possibility of falling prey to 
their hunger for victim flesh.  
 The triangle resolves itself, with the foregrounding of political violence 
when the malevolent A returns, as allegorical of the politics of the time – the 
allusion to Sartre is so strong as to summon urgent contexts of the late 1940s 
that might account for the triangulation and somatic anxiety. Founder 
member of the Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire (RDR), in 1948, 
Sartre had mimicked a far-left version of De Gaulle’s third-force strategy with 
his Rassemblement du peuple français in 1947. Sartre hoped, with the help of 
the ex-Troskyist David Rousset, to create a political meeting-place at the 
frontier between Stalinist communism and reformist socialist (or SFIO) 
policies. Initially successful in recruiting left-wing militants and left-leaning 
‘sans-partis’, the RDF at its meetings voiced strong opposition to the Cold 
War’s ‘politique des blocs’ in favour of a radically democratic grass-roots 
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movement of social emancipation and European socialist integration. Sartre’s 
contribution at the RDR’s first press conference in March 1948 gives the tone: 
 
Most Europeans seem to have already chosen their conquerors. We are 
in a state of war by proxy. The R.D.R. refuses to choose one side out of 
fear of the other. It seeks to counter insidious propaganda, to establish 
contacts with all the European democratic groupings to ensure that 
Europe leads the way in the movement for peace.5  
 
The R.D.R.’s apogée was the enormous meeting at the Salle Pleyel, 13 
December 1948, with a star-studded platform — André Breton, Richard 
Wright, Carlo Levi, Albert Camus, and intellectuals from India, Madagascar, 
Vietnam, Spain and Morocco. Its demise was brought about by Cold War 
politics. David Rousset chose to align the party with American unions and 
invited the anti-communist Sydney Hook to a ‘Journée internationale de 
résistance à la dictature et à la guerre’ in April 1949, as a riposte to the 
communist-organized peace movement. The RDR split up as a result of the 
                                                 
5 Quoted Annie Cohen-Solal, Sartre: Une vie, 1905-1980 (Paris: Gallimard, 
1985), p. 393 (my transl.). 
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ensuing arguments between the pro-communists and the Rousset pro-
American group.  
 It is in the light of these ‘third force’ initiatives that we can go back to 
revisit Molloy spying from the rock, experiencing his two others. As an old 
dying writer confined to his mother’s bed, forced to write pages for a 
nameless group who pay him for reasons obscure, he is asked to start at the 
beginning, and the beginning is this strange vision of the encounter of two 
men in a bare landscape. It is not too far-fetched to speculate that this is 
Beckett’s mocking vision of the postwar French intellectual. Hack scribe to 
invisible forces, enslaved by political power as figured in the intermediary who 
collects his manuscript récit, power internalized as psychoanalytic drives 
detaining the imagination within the parental bed, the writer scripts the 
inaugural moment of the story of writing as an empty allegory of Cold War 
encounter. The writer as third-force témoin d’autrui is a mere mediating 
language machine, abject witness to the polarization of the world into 
opposing entities, A and B/C. As vagrant and ‘sans-parti’, the writer as Molloy 
is ironically well suited to serve as allegorist of the French Cold War, for he 
occupies the triple subject position of the Resistance: fugitive member of the 
underclass dislocated from patriotic attachments like the internationalist 
resistance of the left; obsessed by religious imperatives like the Christian 
resistance movement; driven by obscure desire for the mother country in his 
quest for his mother, like the Gaullistes fighting for the ‘mère–patrie’. 
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 Accustomed, as if by wartime Resistance habits of concealment and 
subterfuge, to fugitive manoeuvres, secret surveillance and maquis survival 
tactics, Molloy gives us his vision of the Cold War encounter as conditioned by 
wartime suspicion and dread of the solitary resister. He spies upon A and B/C 
as a political fugitive or returning Forced Labour Service (STO) deportee 
might: they are enemies, milice alter-egos, men of casual alien power. He is in 
his own country, yet cannot recognize his own home town: it has been taken 
over by the malevolent forces he spies upon with such fear.  
 Writers, Sartre argued, are situated in a no-man’s land between a 
proletariat locked into the Soviet-governed Communist Party and a dying 
bourgeoisie, between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., between abstract capitalism 
and international bureaucratic communism. The writer under such a regimen 
is presumed guilty, ‘the scapegoat of all the political purges’.6 A and B in the 
French Molloy bear features of fabulous icons of power: B with his ‘bâton’ or 
‘massue’ recalls Gargantua, African shamans and head-men, a pilgrim-Merlin, 
a Celtic war-god. A with his ‘paresse flânante’, his cigar and espadrilles and 
accompanying Pomeranian has the arrogance of a modern master, in holiday 
ownership of these foreign fields, like a Supreme Headquarters Allied 
                                                 
6 Sartre, What is Literature?, transl. Bernard Frechtmann (1947) (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 192. 
 10 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF )or Red Army colonel strolling through the 
liberated devastations of Europe.  
 If Molloy by his very name is a mollifying, mollified tertium quid secretly 
and fugitively acting as haunting troisième force ‘pour-soi’ to the two masters 
of the world, he is also the viscous middling subjectivity which is the only role 
available to the European intellectual in the Cold War. ‘The mou or soft,’ Sartre 
argued in L’Etre et le néant, signalled ‘this rather louche character of the 
“substance between two states”’: 
 
In the slimy substance which dissolves in itself there is a visible 
resistance, like the refusal of an individual who does not want to be 
annihilated in the whole of being, and at the same time a softness 
pushed to its ultimate limit. For the soft is only an annihilation which is 
stopped half way; the soft is what furnishes us with the best image of our 
own destructive power and its limitations. (Being, 608) 
 
Molloy is half-way to his own destruction, drawing Moran towards him with 
tentacular force. Seemingly docile victim inviting possession and the exercise 
of arbitrary power, he nevertheless  secretly possesses Moran’s mind. Viscous 
mollitude has this capacity to invert the power relations that would rather it 
reflect the image of our sovereignty, as Sartre goes on to argue: 
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I want to let go of the slimy and it sticks to me, it draws me, it sucks at 
me. […] it is like the supreme docility of the possessed, the fidelity of a 
dog who gives himself even when one does not want him any longer, 
and in another sense there is underneath this docility a surreptitious 
appropriation of the possessor by the possessed. (Being, 609) 
 
It is the passive dog-like and docilely mou Molloy who mollifies the man of 
power, the intellectual with the soft hands caught up in the mysterious 
network of agents of some secret service, milice, resistance cell, subject to the 
authorities of the world, forced to abandon the possessions of his world in the 
quest for the fugitive, like Sartre with his viscous insides. Moran becomes 
obsessed by the errant fetish Molloy, is hobbled and humbled so as to 
resemble him, and the deep mental image he has of him – the Molloy ‘de mes 
entrailles, la caricature que j’en faisais’ in the French (French Molloy, 156), ‘he 
that inhabited me, my caricature of the same’ in the English (115) – becomes a 
startling libidinous monster surfacing from his unconscious, an absolutely 
viscous creature, neutral and neuter. As his quest progresses, the certainties of 
the clandestine political world Moran inhabits, stony as the ‘blocs’ of 
superpower, are dissolved, leaving only the liquid viscous nightmare of 
Molloy’s mollesse: 
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what words can describe this sensation at first all darkness and bulk, with 
a noise like the grinding of stones, then suddenly as soft as water 
flowing […] then little by little a face, with holes for the eyes and mouth 
and other wounds (149) 
 
This liquefaction of his inner somatic drives whenever he thinks about his 
political target, is a consequence of the confusion of Cold War bloc-politics 
with the conflicted existential secrecies of the body. Victim target of the 
network’s secret service to one of the two superpowers, he is also a libidinous 
energy confusing and liquefying the secret narratives of Moran’s inner powers, 
ego and superego.  
 Yet precisely because he is the scapegoat of ‘all the political purges’, he 
is also at the heart of the Cold War. As a bourgeois, he is central and essential 
fodder for the propaganda drives of the two superpowers — Youdi-Gaber-
Moran must reach Molloy at all costs, either to recruit him to ‘their’ bloc, or 
eliminate him from the landscape. Either way, Molloy dominates the A/B/C 
bullying project. As fugitive, liminal, othering presence on the margins of 
power, he is the somatic uncertainty principle which secretly structures the 
opposition between the two powers, the Neuter hidden in the entrails and 
other caverns of the Cold War comedy. Disaggregating fourth troisième force, 
he becomes internalized by the agents in service to the superpowers in a self-
liquefying dynamic of creation-destruction. Like Europe, Molloy’s world is 
 13 
simultaneously a marginalized abdicating territory casually owned and 
dismissed by the new powers, and also the scene of their conflict, the real 
battlefield of the spectral war, like the Ruhr or Indochina. Glimpsing this from 
his rock, Molloy realizes the two powers are in cahoots, meeting, exchanging 
polite words, moving on across this annexed landscape. Yet he cannot begin 
to understand, obsessed as he is with his private quest, that he might really be 
the target of their forces. For he is the mollesse of the project itself, docile 
substratum formed at the unsteady frontier between two rival mental images 
of the two structuring forces each imagining the other and the third forces 
between them. Molloy, simply because he lies between the forces at play in 
the dark comedy as supplementary ‘fourth’ third, is cause of all backsliding 
and internal collapse in the system itself.  
 The Cold War writer, Beckett-Sartre, is interpellated, recruited, hunted 
and disciplined as deadened neutral, as thin membrane between east and 
west, left and right, superpower poles, between fictions of interiority within 
the skull and fictions of a political world of ministering dominions:  
 
perhaps that’s what I am, the thing that divides the world in two, on the 
one side the outside, on the other the inside, that can be as thin as foil, 
I’m neither one side nor the other, I’m in the middle, I’m the partition, 
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I’ve two surfaces and no thickness, perhaps that’s what I feel, myself 
vibrating, I’m the tympanum.7  
 
What the Cold War system generates, then, for Beckett channeling Sartre 
channeling the Marshall Plan/Cominform seductions of postwar France, is a 
sacrificial machine targetting the bourgeois subject at the membranous 
surface between bodily interiority and the world of consciousness, as though 
singled out by twin superpowers. The Trilogy delves deep into the 
somatic/psychoanalytic body-inwardness of the sacrificial membrane, Sartrean 
anxiety imprinted on the substratum of the body’s organs. Unspoken yet 
pressing in on the text, in the wake of Truman’s announcement in September 
1949 that the Soviets had exploded a nuclear device, is the nightmarish fact of 
nuclear power: that it targets, potentially, every citizen in the world. The 
knowledge that the Bomb targets the subject from both sides is played out in 
Molloy’s somatic terror: nuclear anxiety occupies every cell in the body, at the 
level of the nucleus to each cell – the body pierced and wounded, mind 
reduced to irradiated flesh, sacrificial mollesse at bay, witness-scapegoat little 
more than a membrane structured by Cold War superpower. 
 
Bunkers, Beckett, Bowen  
                                                 
7 The Unnameable, Three Novels, p. 386. 
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In his essay ‘Les Peintres de I'empêchement’ (1949), Beckett defines modern 
painting in terms of the ‘mourning of the object’, and describes Bram van 
Velde’s work as figuring ‘burial within the singular, in a space of impenetrable 
proximities, cell painted on the stone of the cell, art of incarceration.’8 Beckett 
crosses the prison cell with something like the self-reproducing organic cell: 
the creative generative impulse has been killed off by an external force that 
has buried the creative unit, isolating it radically from all others, emptying it of 
any function beyond reproducing the fact of its own incarceration/burial. The 
object being mourned is, therefore, not just an aesthetic predicament, but 
occasioned by a political act that isolates, buries, forces stagnant self-regard 
as though locked away within the isolate body. Molloy’s anxiety as Cold War 
sacrificial victim has its corollary at the level of the ‘cell’ of the body-as-
witness, the prison-cell of the compositional context as carceral tomb for the 
subject. The figure of burial, the radical obstacle or ‘empêchement’, is only 
logical if understood within the context of imminent nuclear annihilation. As 
Derrida argued towards the end of the Cold War, ‘the only referent that is 
absolutely real is thus […] an absolute nuclear catastrophe that would 
irreversibly destroy the entire archive and all symbolic capacity, would destroy 
                                                 
8 ‘l’ensevelissement dans l’unique, dans un lieu d’impénétrables proximities, 
cellule peinte sur la pierre de la cellule, art d’incarcération’ (Disjecta, p. 136) 
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the “movement of survival”, what I call survivance, at the very heart of life.’9 
Survivance, or the very idea of human survival, is symbolically buried within a 
tomb-like archive, a memory cell that only records the mourned object as 
trace within an empty space. The superpower triangle structuring the 
targeting of the subject generates another sacrificial triangle within each 
entombed subject, in this apocalyptic fantasy: the cell and the painter and the 
painting of the cell The triangle is enclosed within the imagined somatic 
interior (lmodeled on the radioactively destroyed cell within the body) where 
the art object and cell represent the subject as mourned object, as if in 
endlessly impossibly postmortem melancholia. 
 Beckett’s art of incarceration is imagined, in 1949, in the year of the 
Soviet A-Bomb, in the aftermath of Hiroshima and its revelation of the 
species-destructive power of the technology. Jean Epstein, meditating on 
cinema in 1947, its power to twist spacetime and multiply the real, compared 
experimental film to the bomb: 
 
We do not yet know what the A-Bomb will or will not do or if its 
disintegration will not also devour, in an instant, its masters along with 
                                                 
9 Jacques Derrida, "No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles 
seven missives)," Diacritics, "Nuclear Criticism," (Summer 1984), pp. 26-28 (p. 
28). 
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the whole of their species. The extraordinary realising, materialising force 
of cinema already shines through the banality of the plots and stories 
used in film, and burns whole populations with its creed. Before 
destroying Japan, the mobilized electrons were happy just to pierce a 
little hole in Pierre Curie’s waistcoat.10  
 
Epstein’s semi-conscious triangulation of replicating art, species-destruction 
and the targeting of the individual citizen anticipates Beckett’s sense of the 
new art of incarceration. The loss of the object in Beckett’s bunker figures the 
dream of the loss of species. The idea of the atomic end of the world has a 
piercing effect, psychologically: the imagination under Cold War compulsions, 
in fear of radioactivity’s penetrating fallout, figures its end as a piercing of 
each somatic cell in the body. That fear of contamination has a withering 
effect, destroying the urge to regenerate within the Cold War’s machinic 
spacetime.  
 Beckett’s carceral space anticipates the bunker mentality that Cold War 
nuclear weapons generated at the level of the pierced and wounded citizen 
imagination. The sepulchral underground state of mind is taken up by another 
                                                 
10 ‘Le Cinéma du diable’ (Paris: Editions Jacques Melot,1947), digital edition: < 
http://ks356591.kimsufi.com/~mediasli/IMG/doc/le_cinema_du_diable.doc> 
[my translation] 
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Irish writer, Elizabeth Bowen, in her 1964 novel, The Little Girls. It opens with 
Dinah in a cave in her garden preparing to bury objects in its underground. 
The novel posits an impossible posthuman future inhabited only by what 
Dinah refers to as ‘expressive objects’, remnants of current commodities: ‘“It’s 
for someone or other to come upon in the far future, when practically nothing 
about us – you or me, for instance – would be otherwise known’ (The Little 
Girls, 9). The objects will reverse the cellular nightmare of the Beckettian art of 
incarceration: preserving objects beyond the destruction of the species that 
made them: ‘ “I’m looking ahead to when we are a vanished race’ (9), Dinah 
says. The expressive objects carry with them, superstitiously, the aura of the 
human singularities they occasioned as fetishised things, for each object is 
chosen because it materializes each individual’s unique being: ‘“a person’s 
only a person when they have some really raging peculiarity”’ (10). Dinah’s 
project, then, is to isolate and bury, acknowledging deep ‘inside’ the loss of 
species; yet still countering the nuclear targeting of the individual citizen and 
her lost object-world. It is a childish gesture, perhaps: yet this is Bowen’s point 
too, for Dinah’s anti-nuclear gesture, though it mimics the representational 
catastrophe of the nuclear sacrificial economy, as though painting a cell on 
the cell’s wall like some weird new petroglyph, is designed (as creative bunker 
art) to crystallize and preserve multidirectional memory too.  
 For her art of preservation unconsciously repeats a childhood gesture – 
as a girl, she and two of her childhood friends had, on the eve of the First 
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World War, buried a box, with this sign: ‘We are dead, and all our fathers and 
mothers. You who find this, Take Care. These are our valuable treasures, and 
our fetters’ (134). Written in blood, the text seals the ritual: each girl had put 
significant objects in the little box, including each ‘her secret thing’. Each had 
had to stop their ears in the dark as each individual girl boxed her secret 
object. The memory hoard was sealed up with wax, and ‘signed’ with the 
imprint of their thumbs: the body, its interiority (blood) and surface 
(thumbprint) is inscribed on the buried archive, materialising a fiction that 
plays on the loss of survivance within a hostile parental world entering 
terminal wartime. It is this memory, triggered by her own terrified nuclear 
anxiety in 1963, that sends Dinah on a journey to discover those old friends 
again. When the box is discovered, it is empty, as though grave-robbed, or its 
contents annihilated by time itself. Yet the three are brought together by the 
failed quest for the mourned objects, not as empty vessels of past time, but as 
subjects loving against the grain of the species-targeting sacrificial war god. In 
the Brashfield Address to the American Academy of Arts and Letters in 1953, 
Bowen had meditated upon the relations of the artwork to time, and her mind 
had turned to sacrifice. Men and women, she argued, rather than face up to 
the immediacy of sensations of the contemporary moment, will prefer to 
sacrifice that living immediacy for the sake of a factitious sense of order:  
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It is to our fixed wish, to our wish to envisage “life” that we sacrifice what 
is most true and meaning in the momentary spontaneities of existence. 
And the result of the sacrifice is estrangement; we cannot but wonder 
from time to time, how it is that we seem to be cut off from some great 
part of our power to be.11 
 
Contemporary art enables us to inhabit the world again, to perceive the 
unestranged sensations that incite the imagination to create, regenerating the 
power to be. It does so by carefully placing its object (as the subject of art) so 
that it begins to register time’s energies: ‘To an extent, our time is our art’s 
subject. In so far as – in the novel, in the non-abstract picture – there must be 
an ostensible, concrete subject, that is so chosen, and so placed, as best either 
to illustrate time’s action, to reflect time’s colour, to register time’s pulse’ 
(150). In the novel, the art object that is designed to function as just such a 
contemporary register of contemporary time is not an illustration of what has 
been destroyed – Dinah turns instinctively against the rather kitsch picture of 
the vanished high street where she and her girl friends had lived and 
experienced before the two World Wars.  
                                                 
11 ‘Subject and the Time’ (1953), in Elizabeth Bowen, Listening In: Broadcasts, 
Speeches, and Interviews, ed. Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010):  147-52 (p. 148). 
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 The art object as contemporary statement is rather the sealed box the 
little girls had sealed with their bodies; and it is in the resurrection of that box 
in the anti-nuclear time capsule Dinah buries. Yet the memory of the 
emptiness of the first box, and the annihilating knowledge that it will not be 
our species who in the future will open and ‘read’ the expressive objects in 
Dinah’s cave, conspire together to suggest a bleaker acknowledgement of the 
sacrificial economy that legislates relations between social blindness to the 
contemporary threat and an art of carceral repetition of the lost object. The 
Little Girls suggests that there is something at work in the time-consciousness 
of those born to the twentieth century (‘a time of scientific threats, sense-
deadening scientific concessions’, she argued in the Brashfield Address (150)): 
it suggests that the estranging sacrifice that cuts us off from our power to be 
is structuring the act of making at its empty core. The little girls, and later 
Dinah as an adult, sacrifice their own imaginations as embodied being-in-the-
world; they cut themselves off from the objects that materialize their passions 
and sensations within a dead and deadening simulacra of the body: as metal 
box sealed with blood and imprint; as nuclear bunker. The art object can only 
register and repeat the empty gesture, signifying the airlessness and timeless 
void of the sacrificed mourned object-world of affect and living time-
consciousness. In a grim sense, despite the urgent community Dinah manages 
to summon from the past and its wreckage, one is left not with an art of 
preservation, but an art of sacrifice; sacrifice of little girls to the war Moloch. 
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Cold War Victimhood and Nuclear Sacrifice:  
Benjamin, Ballard, Oliver  
 
If Beckett and Bowen turn to a sacrificial rhetoric to register the fallout from 
the bunkered imagination under Cold War compulsions, it is because of the 
queasy sense that what is being mourned within nuclear time is also what is 
being emptily preserved; and that the lost mourned object will take the shape 
of the childhood most felt to figure what is vulnerable and human, exploiting 
the figure of the female child in particular as most vulnerably the target of the 
masculinist fictions being generated by nuclear patriarchy. Demonstrably, the 
sacrificial rhetoric being conjured has its roots in German Romanticism as 
analyzed by Benjamin in his long 1921 essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities. 
Benjamin explores the hinterland to the idea of sacrifice of the figure or 
‘semblance’ of the girl-child as foundational to the economy of Romantic art 
and death-drive desire. Ottilie is driven towards suicidal self-starvation as a 
result of the drowning of the child in the lake; but Benjamin does not read this 
as a drive that is external to Ottilie. She is being driven by the internal logic of 
her own self-representation, as though her imagination itself harbours the 
hostile power. That hostile power inhabits the archaic and chthonic 
underworld, underground, the deep waters of the landscape in the novel, but 
only begins truly to signify when Ottilie is drawn towards her own death as 
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hunger-strike sacrifice. It is therefore a self-destructive hungry force within her 
flesh and mind, inhabiting her carnality because she so resembles the 
sacrificed ghost she will become:  
 
It is not to be understood, however, as if external need and force bring 
about Ottilie’s destruction; rather, her type of semblance itself is the 
basis for the imperative that the semblance be extinguished and 
extinguished soon.12  
 
She is silenced as ‘the archetype of the innocent sacrificed by the mythic law’, 
according to Kir Kuiken: ‘It is an almost unconscious death sentence, a 
speechless, secret drive which starves her.’13 Ottilie’s withdrawal into herself 
through refusal of food and of speech enacts an entombing of the subject 
within the body-as-sepulchre according to the dictates of a law that Benjamin 
                                                 
12 Benjamin, Walter, ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’, Walter Benjamin: Selected 
Writings, , Volume 1: 1913-1926, edited Marcus Bullock and Michael W. 
Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 297-360 (p. 349). 
13 Kir Kuiken , ‘On the Delineation of Choice and Decision in Benjamin’s 
“Goethe’s Elective Affinities’, Canadian Review of Comparative Literature 31.3 
(2004), 286-308 (pp. 297-8). 
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insists again and again is nothing to do either with her individuality or with an 
external force. Her inner semblance is the sacrificial agent: 
 
This silencing of the moral voice is not to be grasped, like the muted 
language of affects, as a feature of individuality. It is not a determination 
of the boundaries of human being. With this silence, the semblance 
(Schein) has installed itself consumingly in the heart of the noblest being. 
(‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’, p. 337) 
 
The self-silencing signals the hungry consumption of interiority that 
constitutes the sacrifice of the little girl within. As though enacted by a 
monster of the underworld, as though triggered by suicidal impulse, the act of 
sacrifice is in fact, for Benjamin, a self-cancelling emptying-out of subjectivity 
as the price paid for resembling such a perfect victim of the law. The law 
internalizes itself as radical self-estrangement, as a self-consuming death drive 
which monumentalizes the sacrificed subject as both a tribute to art’s power 
to fabricate tragic resemblances, and as a dehumanizing graving of the ego as 
uncanny allegory of the secret, silent, immobilized and underground 
unconscious. Ottilie withdraws into her non-being, allows the law of 
semblance to emerge from her insides, allows this semblant force to rob her 
of voice and nourishment, and dies under the death sentences of a patriarchal 
law she has taken in deep within her abandoned vitals. 
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 It is this fiction of the self-consuming sacrificial girl which Beckett sets 
spinning in the form of the ‘feminized’ Molloy courted by Cold War agents, 
which we have seen Bowen explore in similar fashion with her nuclear fiction, 
The Little Girls. It returns again in later texts of the period, as if to underline 
further how far Romantic self-sacrifice as a tribute to internalized patriarchal 
law is felt again to have returned in the nuclear threat targeting every subject 
in the Cold War. J.G. Ballard’s 1969 The Atrocity Exhibition explores the 
victimizing effects of technology in the nuclear era, with celebrity fanaticism 
and mediatized consumer cultures transformed by the death drive written in 
to the postwar contemporary by Hiroshima. In one of the peculiarly haunting 
paragraphs of the novel, ‘The Persistence of the Beach’, Ballard’s Bomb-
traumatized and lustful focalizer dreams of the sacrificed victim projected by 
nuclear fantasy as he wanders round a surrealist landscape, the weapons 
range beach (a cross between Trinity sands and Bikini): 
 
The white flanks of the dunes reminded him of the endless promenades 
of Karen Novotny’s body – diorama of flesh and hillock; the broad 
avenues of the thighs, piazzas of pelvis and abdomen, the close arcades 
of the womb. This terracing of Karen’s body in the landscape of the 
beach in some way diminished the identity of the young woman asleep 
in her apartment. He walked among the displaced contours of her 
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pectoral girdle. What time could be read off the slopes and inclines of 
this inorganic musculature, the drifting planes of her face?14  
 
The mise-en-scène sketches a Dali-esque world of nuclear-technologized 
sexual politics, the beach a projection of both unconscious sexual desire for 
the death-resemblant sleeping woman, and of cravings for radiation and 
apocalypse in a nuclear cinema of sacrificed affect. The mix has the taste of 
atrocity insofar as it makes a gigantic goddess-fetish out of the female body 
at the same time as burying her within a lethal genocidal fiction in an act of 
monumentalizing identity-destruction. This is sacrifice as pin-up and torture-
porn, but strikes up the resemblances to Ottilie’s self-consuming and self-
silencing death-drive as Romantic pretext for the indulgence of its killing 
technophilia. The sacrifice is a fraudulent diorama, sacrificing the nobility of 
the victim on the altar of lethal sex comedy. 
 A similar crisis-point fusion of emptied Romantic gesture and low 
sadistic comedy informs Douglas Oliver's 1973 novel The Harmless 
Building and its staging of inner organ anxiety and warfare.15 For Oliver, we 
are all subject to the stream of news (114), and the media saturation of the 
                                                 
14 J.G. Ballard, The Atrocity Exhibition: Annotated (1970) (London: Flamingo, 
2002), p. 59. 
15 Three Variations on the Theme of Harm (London: Paladin,1990). 
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subject infiltrates the novel’s link between the revolutionary struggle in 
Uruguay between Cold War right and left and the kidnapping and death of a 
Down’s Syndrome child. It is as though the melodrama of the Cold War has to 
infect even the power to mourn the death of one close to you on the very 
closest of home fronts. The protagonist’s struggle to keep the child ‘alive in 
[his] mind’ is equated with the very grounds of the possibility of a world 
without harm – figured as ‘an area of almost no-harm like a clearing in the 
middle of harm’ (113). The fusion of supranational politics and domestic 
feeling goes deeper, though: Douglas sees politics shaping our inner world as 
though that no-harm clearing were the zone of affect deep within the citizen’s 
insides. Those insides, paradoxically, begin to leak out into the landscape, as 
Karen Novotny’s body had done. In The Harmless Building, there is a surreal 
beach too, fusing scene and guts: ‘They talked of brown estuary mud at 
sunset, comparing the gleaming patterns to endless stomach muscles 
stretching towards a tide-line’ (128). It is as though the saturation of worlds by 
rival worlds renders bodies porous, hungry for the unknown without as if 
consuming the unknown patterns within the silent realm of the body. The 
novel witnesses what it calls an eyelid swarm, a perceptual assault on and by 
the body figured in the mysterious rhythms of self-firing neurons in the brain 
– the mystery of the inner body is compared to the mystery of international 
politics, the ‘bits of information’ streaming through time (131). Donald’s 
anxiety and hypochondria is very close to political paranoia: ‘the treachery of 
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wrong air pressure between various enclosed body areas from anus to brain’, 
as though the fractured world of Cold War blocs and factions and secrecies is 
a double projection effect, body beaming out to globe, and globe to inward 
carnal space. His fear of cancer is fear of something nameless as death, and 
this creates an ‘alternative identity site’ within the body, ‘schizophrenic 
patterns’ in the eyes (147). This double system of alternative identity is 
generated, I would argue, by the ways each mind and body in the postwar 
period feels targeted by nuclear culture. This is troped in the novel in the 
repeated reference to assassination: a pointing gun is said to give the naked 
body a double sensation, both as a small black circle within a white target 
spot and as whole body expanding nervously in fear of being targeted (194). 
This is a Kennedy fantasy as semblance of the Cold War body-landscape 
interface, mutually doubling up the alternative identities under compulsion.  
 And at the heart of the whole system is the dark fiction of child 
sacrifice: the novel turns remorselessly towards the little hut in the woods and 
the figure of the sacrificed Down’s Syndrome child. That little hut is, 
unspeakably, in the exact same spot as the harmless building in the clearing 
where no-harm was fitfully dreamed in defence against the Cold War 
mechanics. The very dream of no-harm is complicit in the sacrifice of child, 
complicit at the infected, toxic level of the politicized insides of the Cold War 
citizen: ‘The voodoo death is in all of us who are dominated. All who snub and 
have contempt for us curse our stomach, lungs and heart’ (168). Oliver’s 
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pitiless sensing of Cold War sacrifice takes on the evil comedy of political 
domination’s fictions of sacrifice as voodoo death; and finds release only but 
importantly in its political animus against the enemy dreaming inside. 
 
The mimetic triangle and homo sacer scapegoat: Girard and Agamben 
René Girard’s theory of mimetic desire is useful when trying to think through 
Oliver’s sense of doubleness. Girard understands emulation of the other in 
terms of double mediation. Two desiring subjects coming together will act out 
their emulation in a doubling struggle generated by the imbalance in power 
that reproduces Hegelian master-slave dialectic. The master-slave double act 
creates and is created by two superimposed triangles, for Girard, made up of 
subject, object and mediator of desire – and this double mediation leads to 
the metamorphosis of the object that is common to both partners.16 Girard 
was clearly influenced by the gigantic double mediation at work in the 
superpower world of the Cold War, for he writes of the doubles in terms of a 
totalitarian duality, and understands that duality in terms of ‘twin structures’ 
that read very like the world of nuclear politics: ‘All the forces of being are 
gradually organized into twin structures whose opposition grows ever more 
                                                 
16 René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary 
Structure, translated Yvonne Freccero (1961) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), pp. 99-101. 
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exact’ (137).  The mediator in between the twin structures resembles the 
mediating role taken by UN and non-aligned figures in the Cuban missile 
crisis. The curious mutual effect of having the triangle in operation 
acknowledges the ways in which superpower talks and threats have infiltrated 
citizen interiority: ‘Double mediation has invaded the growing domain of 
collective existence and wormed its ways into the more intimate depths of the 
individual soul, until finally it stretches beyond national boundaries and 
annexes countries’ (138). What becomes as clear, if we adduce Girard’s late 
Cold War books on the scapegoat, the 1982 Le Bouc émissaire (The Scapegoat 
in the 1985 translation), and the 1985 Job, the Victim of his People, is that the 
mediator, in acting as the object common to the twin structures, can become, 
and is always fantasized as becoming, a sacrificial subject. As surrogate victim, 
the mediator acts out ‘that powerful element shared in common by so many 
biblical texts yet mysteriously ignored by everyone. There is no doubt that the 
intellectual expulsion of this scapegoat victim is the continuation of the 
physical violence of antiquity’.17 The scapegoat victim begins to resemble the 
‘bare forked animal’ targeted by biopower in Agamben’s celebrated analysis: 
as though the sacrificial quarry were foundational to politics itself, necessary 
                                                 
17 René Girard, Job the Victim of his People translated Yvonne Freccero (1985) 
(London: Athlone Press, 1987), p. 8. 
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agent of the manner in which late modernity summons up primitivist rituals to 
sanction the paralegal violence of its dialectic. 
 For Giorgio Agamben, the body is always already biopolitical, caught 
up as it is in the nets and networks of power once reduced to the nec plus 
infra of bare life: nothing in it, or the economy it is caught up in, seems to 
allow for opposition to the demands of sovereign power (187). But one can 
use Girard’s discussion of sacrifice to suggest some way forward. Girard 
defines as one of the four signs of the scapegoat that the victims are chosen 
not for the crimes they are accused of but for the fact they bear the marks of 
the victim on and in their bodies, marks that act as symbols of their guilty 
relationship to the crisis – for instance, Oedipus’s infirmity of body (The 
Scapegoat, 24). If we think of Ottilie’s semblance, the sign she must always 
have to act the role of scapegoat is this Schein, the resemblance she bears on 
the surface to her body, as if shining from within. For Girard, this identificatory 
signal might be anything that combines ‘the marginality of the insider with the 
marginality of the outsider’ (25) – or, one might argue, anything that fuses the 
marginality of one’s insides with the marginality of the political world as 
(mis)understood by the collective citizen imagination. What shines out is the 
holy victimhood that was always primitively there before the sacrificial 
dialectical machinery even began to grind into action. What is perceived as if 
it had been always there is the deep inner vulnerability of the subject 
withdrawn into shining entrail and sacrificial inner organ. Agamben 
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distinguishes between those who are sacrificial victims and those whose bare 
life renders them killable and unsacrificeable since beyond ritual. Yet if one 
reads Girard and Benjamin together, and holds in mind the self-entombing 
nuclear subject dreamt by Bowen and Beckett, then the distinction breaks 
down. The homo sacer under conditions of Cold War speciescide threat shines 
out from the citizen’s insides as though irradiated by the nuclear imagining 
imposed by the three-way dialectic of Cold War sovereignty: the citizen 
becomes killable at any moment as sacrificial victim. That is if we take the act 
of sacrifice to mean the fusion of insider and outsider marginalities through 
internalization of sovereign chthonic powers and silencing reduction of the 
subject to cursed ‘stomach, lungs and heart’. Anselm Haverkamp defines the 
homo sacer as the ‘zone in which the actual addressee of all violence is laid 
bare’:18 this helps to wrest Ottilie and other semblant victims from the state of 
exception: we are all potential addressees of violence. Elsewhere, Haverkamp 
argues that ‘the rhetorical establishment of the enemy in confessional warfare 
both hides away and displaces the interior sacrifice, the victimization and 
                                                 
18 Anselm Haverkamp, ‘Anagrammatics of Violence: The Benjaminian Ground 
of Homo Sacer’, in Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio 
Agamben’s Homo Sacer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 135-144 (p. 
140). 
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traumatization possibly and necessarily of every body’.19 If we follow 
Benjamin’s Schein, if we follow Beckett to the Molloy of one’s entrails and the 
incarceral art of the abandoned subject/object, and if we understand Bowen’s 
sense of the nuclear bunkering of interiority and Oliver’s vision of voodoo 
death as child-sacrificial under the compulsions of Cold War nuclear 
sovereignty, then that interior sacrifice must be the zone in which all citizens 
under power dream their victimization: the deep insides that are silently ours 
and not ours, the fleshly unconscious of the organ world within. 
 The sacrificial triangle turns on the victim-mediator, the substance 
between two states: the inner organs of the Cold War citizen figured as ‘child’ 
to be sacrificed to the nuclear future, as soft mollitude between political forces 
that have annexed the body and enforced the interior sacrifice according to 
the twisted and internalized (silenced) logic of semblance and double 
mediation. This somatic third force within stands crudely (because so 
viscerally) for the mystery of our own drives as troped and hidden within 
organs, buried in the earth as expressive object offered to the gods of this 
world – but aiming, nevertheless, as zone of no-harm too, towards some 
                                                 
19 ‘The Enemy has no Future: Figure of the Political’, Cardozo Law Review 26.6 
(May 2005: < http://www.kuwi.europa-
uni.de/de/lehrstuhl/lw/westeuropa/Haverkamp/publikationen/rara/The_Enem
y_2003.pdf> [Accessed 5/10/2014]. 
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impossible post-nuclear future beyond futurelessness, as a bunkered 
interiority sealed by the child’s body imprint. This zone becomes a hut where a 
child is also sacrificed: on the weapons range beach or in the terminal burial 
zones of the Cold War. The victim is at once another Iphegenia whose 
exploded sacrificial body acts itself out as theatre of the Cold War; and our 
own child self/own children’s selves victimized and traumatized by voodoo 
Cold War politics. The two spectral enemies of nuclear culture impose two 
triangles on the mind and focus their target on the inner child as inner organ: 
‘They were suspended within the large mansion as in a miraculous egg formed 
in the infertile stomach of the dreaming building within the spiritualized body 
of the dreaming baby’ (Three Variations, 125). The bare life sacrificed to 
biopower in the Cold War needs to be redefined as a child’s vulnerable being, 
both host to all dreaming and spiritualizing of all intimate relationships, and 
sacrificial victim of the double mediation of scapegoating politics. That double 
child lived (and still lives) within each and every citizen body under nuclear 
threat and targeting, the politics of blocs (in our guts and entrails, in ‘that 
inner space one never sees, the brain the heart and other caverns’) always 
ready to kill the child as surrogate target of the victimization and 
traumatization possibly and necessarily of every body in the world. 
 
 
 
